November 3, 2020

Week 12 Presentation Notes

Week 12 Plan:

1.   Rorty's Redescription of Pragmatism Using the 'Vocabulary' Vocabulary
- Pragmatism after the linguistic turn.
- Social pragmatism about discursive norms.

2.   Post-Rortyan Linguistic Pragmatism: Price on Getting <u>Truth</u> from Disagreement
- Discursive practice requires the possibility of practical disagreement.
- Disagreement depends on relations of rational incompatibility of contents.
- Such incompatibility is intelligible in terms of truth: incompatible contents cannot both be *true*.
- The truth-norm implicit in taking disagreement to indicate someone is *wrong* is irreducible to and constrains assessments of the assertibility, entitlement or justification of individuals' commitments.

Price's pragmatist reconstruction of a truth-norm is *not* either
    i.   merely Rortyan-cautionary nor
    ii.   Jamesian-instrumental "what works", nor
    iii.   Deweyan-Sellarsian-Dummettian assertibility, nor
    iv.   Peircean-Wrightian end-of-inquiry superassertibility.

The rest of this session is putting this constructive pragmatist achievement of Price's into a variety of wider contexts:

3.   From incompatibility to implication
An argument parallel to Price's (from "Truth and Assertibility"):
- Incompatibility relations articulate reasons *against.*
- Implication relations articulate reasons *for*.
- In each case, looking *down*stream to the consequences of commitments takes us beyond assertibility: the circumstances *up*stream that would entitle us to them.

4.   Pragmatics, semantics, and pragmatisms
- Pragmatics is the theory of the *use* of expressions.
- Semantics is the study of their meaning or content.

Three kinds of pragmatism:
- Semantic nihilism. (Wittgenstein, Rorty)
- Semantic instrumentalism. (Dummett, Price)
- Pragmatics : Semantics :: Observation : Theory.

5.   *Formal* semantics and *philosophical* semantics.

- **Formal semantics** has the job of computing semantic interpretants associated with compound expressions from the semantic interpretants associated with simpler ones.
- **Philosophical** semantics is to explain what it is about the *use* of expressions in virtue of which semantic interpretants of the kind needed for one's formal semantics get associated with expressions: what it is for expressions to be *used* in such a way that those practices *confer* the right kind of *meanings* to do formal semantics with.

6.   Expressivism and Pragmatist Formal Semantics

The Frege-Geach point that expressivists must deal with the use of declarative sentences as embedded components of compound sentences, hence as not themselves force-bearing—which distinguishes second-wave Humean expressivists (HEX) such as Blackburn and Gibbard from first-wave expressivists like Ayer and Stevensono—is recognizably the demand that one be able to do *formal* semantics on the basis of what one makes available in one's pragmatic metavocabulary. This is a demand of *philosophical* semantics.

<u>Conclusion</u>:
- The first key lesson is that in addition to looking at what entitles one to (commitment to) a claimable, upstream, one must also look downstream to what (commitment to) a claimable
        i) entitles one (is a reason for) and
        ii) precludes entitlement to (is a reason against).
I exploit the first, and Price exploits the second. But the points belong together.
- It turns out that doing that enables one to satisfy the Frege-Geach/formal semantics requirement (criterion of adequacy) of getting a notion of content that can go with *embedded* occurrences of declarative sentences, not just *asserted* ones.

Notes for Week 12:

1.   **Rorty's Redescription of Pragmatism**:

a) It is essentially *linguistic* pragmatism.
Pragmatism after the linguistic turn.
Now, language is at center stage.
RR develops a distinctively *linguistic* pragmatism, or "vocabulary pragmatism": pragmatism after the "linguistic turn." It is the pragmatism of the 'vocabulary' vocabulary.
        It is this move that lets him see Quine and Sellars and Davidson as pragmatists (and thought he is not a reader of Dummett, Price and I can see Dummett as belonging in there, too). It is this constellation of attitudes that bring the later Wittgenstein into the fold.

b) Pragmatism is transposed into, or *redescribed* in, *normative* terms.

c) Norms are understood as instituted by social practices.
So: any norms governing linguistic *practice* must be intelligible in practical terms, in terms of that practice, not in terms of authorities *external to* that practice.

   d) Pragmatism as anti-authoritarianism is a consequence.

2.   **Post-Rortyan Linguistic Pragmatism: Price**

Price is playing entirely by Rorty's rules.
Those are also the rules of a subject naturalist, though the restriction of the pragmatic metavocabulary to a naturalist one is off stage. He is comfortable talking about the norms implicitly acknowledged by discursive practitioners. [OK, that is my paraphrase of how he is talking.]
He finds implicit in essential (categorial!) features of discursive practice the resources to discern a truth norm as active and acknowledged in our conversational practice.

Price's account in "Truth as Convenient Friction" (TCF):

a) RR can understand norms of justification, of giving and asking for (social perspective) and giving and challenging (reasons for and reasons against) reasons, in terms of practices of accepting/rejecting, (perhaps positively/negatively sanctioning) performances.
But he only has available models of *truth* that invoke an authority external to practice.
Price and I aim at reconstructing truth-like norms within social discursive practices.

And his pragmatism is aimed at the topic demarcated by declarativism: what it is that claimings and claimables, what is expressed by declarative sentences, have in common in their use.

b) Price responds constructively: let's look at linguistic practice and see whether it is true that all that is visible there is a norm of justification.

c) He looks at the practical, implicit acknowledgment of *incompatibility*, manifested in the social phenomenon of *disagreement*.
To examine this, he considers beings not capable of disagreement.
They are only capable of Merely Opinionated Assertion (MOA): e.g. "I like vanilla ice-cream."
Their practice is wildly different from ours.
In fact, unrecognizable as *claiming* at all.
For they never are obliged to *retract* a claim.

[Read passages from TCF from Handout.]

d) He argues that the way judgments of incompatibility swing free of questions of adjudicating relative justification or entitlement shows that there is a distinct norm.
Disagreement shows that *someone* is wrong.
And that judgment of 'wrongness' does *not* depend on assessments of the justification of each claim. We can assess this kind of wrongness—someone must be wrong in the case of disagreement—independently of assessing justificatory credentials.
These judgments have *consequences*, downstream, for such assessments of justificatory credentials, but do not *depend on* them, upstream.

    c) These *exclusive* truth-assessments in some sense govern or dominate assessments of justification-entitlement: Where there is genuine disagreement, we can know in advance of further investigation that both parties cannot be *ultimately* justified. For what is a reason *for* one position is a reason *against* the other.

    d) Relations of incompatibility can be understood or paraphrased in terms of <u>truth</u>.
Incompatible claimables cannot both be *true*.
That bears on justification, but is not reducible to it.
(Thinking it is so reducible is the Peirce-Wright mistake.)

    e) Q: How robust a notion of <u>truth-norm</u> can we get out of this relation: *cannot be true together*, or *cannot **both** be true*?

i) On the one hand, this is disagreeing with Rorty's criticism of truth-talk that goes beyond the modest acknowledgment of fallibility. On the other hand, it is a constructive theoretical attempt to reconstruct an account of what we are *doing* in *assessing* truth that should be acceptable to a Rortyan pragmatist.
j) This is a pragmatist conception of truth that is *not* either
    i.   merely cautionary (what I'm justified in now might not ultimately turn out to be justified), or
    ii.   Jamesian-instrumental "what works", or
    iii.   Deweyan-Sellarsian-Dummettian assertibility, or

iv.   Peircean-Wrightian end-of-inquiry superassertibility.

This is a huge achievement in the annals of pragmatism, particularly *linguistic* pragmatism, pragmatism that focuses on specifically *linguistic*, that is, *discursive* (concept-deploying) practice.

I then want to put this pragmatist achievement of Price's into a variety of wider contexts:

3.   **From incompatibility to implication:**

My use of consequences of application in "Truth and Assertibility" (T&A), to do the same thing: get an implicit truth-norm playing by Rorty's rules.

i. The underlying idea of T&A, I can now retrospectively discern, is that if one looks at the full inferential roles of sentences, in the sense of their involvements in relations of being-a-reason-*for*, one sees that *two* sorts of assessments are implicitly involved.

This distinction will later be articulated as an issue about *entitlement* (corresponding to assessments of justification) and an issue about *commitment* (corresponding to assessments of truth).

The key point is that **if one looks not only *upstream*, to what would entitle one to make a claim (its *assertibility conditions*, thought of as justification conditions, what reasons there are *for* it, in the sense of premises) but also *downstream, to* what follows from claiming it (making the claim, undertaking the commitment that is the practical significance of asserting the declarative sentence that expresses the conceptual propositional content being articulated), one will see the two dimensions of implicit normative assessment**.

ii. One can see the point in (i) by looking at the practical effects (pragmatic significance) of *substitution* of one sentence for another as *premises* and as *conclusions* of reasons-*for* relations. Here the key observation is that two (nonlogical) sentences can play the *same* role as *conclusions* of material inferences (reasons for) but *different* roles as *premises* of material inferences. Arguably (and we can regiment expressions so as to *make* it so),

1. **I will write a book about Rorty**,

and

2. **I *foresee* (predict) that I will write a book about Rorty**,

have the same *assertibility conditions*. I am *justified* in asserting the one, I am *entitled* to assert the one just in case I am justified or entitled to assert the other, in the sense that whatever is a *reason for* one is a *reason for* the other.

But, (1) and (2) do *not* have the same *consequences*. What *follows from* (asserting) them is not the same. The are not *reasons for* the same set of further claims.

For instance, (1) follows from (1), by the "stuttering inference."

But (1) does *not*, in the same sense, follow from (2).

What I foresee doing is not always what I actually do.

We can put this point in terms of **circumstances** and **consequences** of application, as I will later do in *MIE,* following Dummett.

But for purposes of comparison with Price's TCF, the most important characterization is in terms of what is a reason *for* each claimable and what that claimable is a reason *for*.

For I want to say that Price is making a parallel point, but using the relation of being a reason *against* to enforce the same distinction. In that case, the idea is that reasons *against* are commitments that *preclude entitlements*.

iii.   The next point (in T&A) is a minor, potentially distracting one. It is that a recipe for producing claimables that have the same circumstances of appropriate application ("assertibility conditions") but different consequences of application is to form "expression-statement pairs," ("ESP"s). The first element of such a pair *expresses* an attitude (in the case of (1) and (2) a *prediction*) and the second *states that* one has that attitude. The paradigm here will be undertakings of commitments by assertion and self-ascriptions of those propositional attitudes:
3. *p,*
and
4. I believe (assert that) *p*.
For any ESPs of this form, (3) will follow from (3), and not from (4).

iv. An essential element of the argument is then the following:
We can express the fact that different things follow from (1) and (2) (and (3) and (4)) by saying that (although they have the same *assertibility* conditions), they have different *truth* conditions. Here the weight-bearing claim is that differences in *consequences*, differences in what *follows from* two claims, differences in what they are sufficient *reasons for,* is sufficient for them to have different *truth* conditions.
So we can understand the pragmatic signficance of <u>truth conditions</u> in terms of the *inferential role* of sentences as *reasons for* other claims.

v. The fact that pairs such as <(1),(2)>, and in general, any claims of the form <(3),(4)> can have the *same assertibility* conditions and *different truth* conditions shows that **there is a difference in the *pragmatic use* declarative sentences in making assertions, a difference visible in terms of what is a reason for them and what they are reasons for, that corresponds to the two *semantic* dimensions of *normative* appraisal or assessment: justification and truth.**
Recall that we will later understand this also in terms of the distinction between appropriate *circumstances* of application and appropriate *consequences* of application.
In (b) I will argue, comparing this argument with Price's in "Truth as Convenient Friction," that I am making an argument appealing to the inferential roles of sentences in *reason for* relations that he is making appealing to the inferential roles of sentences in *reason against* relations.

vi. But I continue to turn the crank, piling on more considerations (and in many ways muddying the waters), by introducing *conditionals* at this point.
Conditionals *codify* reason-for relations.
(In the parallel case of Price, in (b), the corresponding move would be to look at *negation*, which codifies reason-*against* relations. And that is just what he does, in "Why 'Not'?".)

vii. That relation of codification is to be understood on the model of expression-statement pairs, of the sort epitomized by (3) and (4). The generic notion of <u>codification</u> or <u>expression</u> that these relations are species of is that the second element of the relations (2) and (4) *says* what one is *doing* in asserting the first element, (1) and (3). In this case the *implicit doing* that is *codified* or *expressed* in a sayable (claimable, statable) is

5. endorsing the goodness of the inference from *p* to *q,*

and the statable, claimable *saying* that codifies or expresses that practical *doing* is

6. *p—>q,* if *p* then *q*.

Claimable (6) *says* what one is *doing* in (5).

And the thought is that this is recognizably the *same* sense of 'saying' and 'doing' that characterizes (1) and (2), and (3) and (4).

Here we see, *in nuce* [do I actually know what that means?], what I will later call an "expressive" approach to demarcating the functional role distinctive of *logical* vocabulary.

The line of thought I am articulating and unpacking here shows just **how much of *MIE* really was already implicit in "Truth and Assertibility"** (which was a chapter of my dissertation).

It also shows that there are way too many moves being packed into the compass of a single article.

viii. In a move that diverges from what will later come to seem to me to be the wrong (less fruitful) order of explanation, I then consider a language that already has the expressive capacity of conditionals in it, a language that lets one *say* what is a *reason for* what.

(And *a propos* of (b), in an eerily parallel way, a decade later Huw will essentially make the parallel move for *reasons against* and negation.)

The thought is (I think), that once we see what the expressive role distinctive of conditionals is, we can see that there can be *purely pragmatic* ways of recognizing that the *use* of some expressions gives them the pragmatic significance of conditionals. Thus this category of linguistic expression should be respectable for the pragmatist: for Rorty, or for the Quine of "Two Dogmas." In particular, we do not need to appeal to any notion of <u>truth</u> in order to characterize the use of conditionals, when they are understood on this expressive model. One might have thought that one needed the notion of <u>truth value</u>, itself then sufficient to fund a notion of <u>truth conditions</u>, in order to introduce "material" conditionals by truth-tables. But I am making (what will come to be recognizable as a semantic *inferentialist* point) that one can understand conditionals *directly*, in terms of the reason-for relation. And *that* relation is discernible already in the *pragmatic use* of expressions.

(Of course I don't actually *say* any of that in T&A, because I had not yet sorted out the ideas that swarm in here like angry bees pouring out of a hive that has been disturbed.

My 1980 ms. "Assertion and Conditionals" shows just how painful beginning to sort out these issues of semantic inferentialism and logical expressivism, and the relations between pragmatics and semantics, and assertibility and truth were.)

For all these still-implicit background reasons, I take myself to be entitled to consider a language-in-use that already contains conditionals.

(The difference in order of presentation that would follow conceptual primacy that I referred to above is that one ought, I came to think, think instead about *introducing* conditionals into a language-in-use that does *not* already have that expressive power.)

ix. Assuming such a background language-in-use containing conditionals, we can appeal to the same *substitutional* methodology used in connection with ESPs above to distinguish *pragmatically,* that is, in terms of the *use* of declarative sentences (as premises and conclusions of reason-for relations) between assertibility conditions (looking upstream to circumstances of application) and truth conditions (looking downstream to consequences of application) to argue that two *conditionals* can only have the same *assertibility* conditions if their antecedents have the same *truth* conditions.

(Note that this appeal to the methodology of observing *inferential* (semantic) invariants under *substitution* will become an explicit part of the ISA semantic hierarchy of inferentialism in Part Two of *MIE*. In T&A I am *using* it without at that point reflecting on the significance of what I am doing.)

In these terms and in this way, I then claim, we can *define truth* conditions in terms of *assertibility* conditions. Truth conditions are what one must add to assertibility conditions in order to be able to compute recursively the assertibility+ conditions of compound sentences from the assertibility+ conditions of their components.

x. This was all a way of using the pragmatically available (I was supposing) notion of <u>reason-for relations</u> (with some help from a *substitutional* methodology) to show what *semantic* work a notion of <u>truth</u> might do in a *pragmatist* account of discursive practice (the *use* of a vocabulary).
It is at this level that the enterprise is recognizably parallel to what Huw is doing in with the notion of <u>reason-against relations</u> in "Truth as Convenient Friction."

a) This leads into second punchline [First is Huw's achievement in TCF.]:
Price's appeal to *incompatibility* and my appeal to *consequences* (implication) are related as reasons *against* and reasons *for*.
b) We can understand both as looking *downstream* and not merely *upstream* (as assertibility theories do), to see practical differences in the treatment of claimables.
c) "Why 'Not'?":

[Read the dialogue about Fred in the garden, from the handout.]

In connection with "Why 'Not'?",
- I can discuss the difference between *mere* difference and *exclusive* difference or *incompatibility*.
- Then can consider why this should be thought of as *symmetric*.
- Could then offer Ryan Simonelli's argument for this claim.

d) This is an argument against a ***rationally dogmatic*** practice: one that only has reasons *for*.
No incompatibility relations, underwriting reasons *against* in the form of *exclusions*: premises (commitments to claimables) that *preclude entitlement* to others.
So, no practical *disagreements*.
Claim is: any such discursive practice is radically defective.
In effect, an essential element of the *practical framework* that makes claiming possible—that is needed to confer propositional content on declarative sentences—is missing.

The claim that **negation**, what is expressed by 'not', plays this expressive role of making explicit (in claimable form) an implicit feature that is essential to the minimal practical framework of claiming, is the claim that it has ***categorial* status** as a concept.

e) We can ask about the converse, a *rationally **skeptical*** practice: one that only has reasons *against*. There would be no *implication* relations underwriting consequential reasoning, the drawing of conclusions from premises.
These are the relations made explicit by *conditionals*, rather than *negation*.
Then there would be no way of becoming *rationally entitled* to claims.
We might have a default-and-challenge structure of entitlement.
And it might include default entitlement to (sincere) noninferential reports.

But all *reasoning* would consist of *infirming* those entitlements.

If and insofar as this sort of practice is also unrecognizable as one of claiming, **conditionals**, too, would have *categorial* status.

f) It seems, then, that a minimal discursive practice cannot be either rationally *dogmatic* or rationally *skeptical*. It must be **rationally *critical***, in that it has *both* reasons *against* and reasons *for*.

g) Its **minimal categorial concepts**, used to make explicit the features in virtue of which to be a *rational* practice it must be a *critical* practice, are the two basic connectives of sentential logic: ***negation*, making explicit incompatibilities or reasons *against*, and a *conditional*, making explicit implications or reasons *for***.

(We can throw in the Boolean helper-monkeys, conjunction and disjunction if we like, but we know how to define them DeMorganwise from negation and the conditional, not only in a classical logic, but in an intuitionistic one, too.)

h) The categorial status of negation and conditionals accordingly means that we are well on our way to **a pragmatist account of the content of *logical* concepts**, without yet having had to do any formal semantics.

But, since *logistical* languages are the first ones to get formal semantic treatment—both in the Tarskian model-theoretic and the Kripkean possible-worlds semantic metavocabularies—we are well on our way to the possibility of a pragmatist formal semantics. More on this below.

Could make the parallel between the way Price goes on from Rorty to do detailed work on practices of distinguishing true/false claims, and the way I do.

I offer more sophisticated deflationary stories about 'true' and 'refers', and further positive stories, specifically:

i. Social-perspectival story of JTB conditions,

ii. Social-perspectival story about *de re* ascriptions of propositional attitude.

Price offers practical importance of disagreement and (so) incompatibility.

What would be ideal would be to show how to synthesize these positive stories (Price's and mine).

This is what is most characteristic of the next, post-Rortyan wave, of pragmatism—at least as epitomized by Price and me:

The **constructive theoretical task** is to look to see how much of representationalist rhetoric (and, to be fair, the insights it misguidedly expresses) can in fact be reconstructed in pragmatically hygienic, sanitized terms, terms that are **acceptable to a Rortyan-Quinean 'vocabulary'-vocabulary linguistic pragmatist (and social pragmatist about normativity)**.

4. **Pragmatics, semantics, and pragmatisms**.

a) Pragmatics in the sense of the study of the *use* of language, of specifically *discursive* practice. (That focus is characteristic of Rorty's redescription of pragmatism in terms of the 'vocabulary' vocabulary.)

Even more specifically (depending on nontrivial collateral commitments), pragmatics as the study of what one is *doing* in *saying* anything, in the central sense of *asserting* it.

Semantics is then the study of *meanings*.

(Here I use Wittgensteinian language:

He never said "Meaning is use."
[Distinction between an expert researcher and a scholar of an area: Can authoritatively make negative existential claims: LW *nowhere says* that-*p*. *Some* sorts of scholarship are easier with searchable corpora, others not really.]
He did say:"Don't look to the meaning, look to the use."]

b) Pragmatists (of the classical sort, the Rortyan sort, the subject-naturalist sort, and the Humean expressivist sort will start by focusing on the pragmatics.
But now we can ask about relations between pragmatics and semantics.

Should pragmatists even do semantics, even deploy a notion of <u>meaning</u>?
- ***Semantic nihilists*** say 'No'.
Dummett takes LW to be a semantic nihilist in this sense.
In our own time, the great Wittgensteinian Charles Travis's critique of truth-conditional semantics in terms of "occasion sensitivity", radical context-dependence, is a prime example of semantic nihilism.
- Dummett himself is a ***pragmatist behaviorist*** about semantics.
He understands meanings as postulated to codify regularities or proprieties (big methodological divide here!) of use. But the *only* sorts of meanings he allows, methodologically, are those that are directly and explicitly *definable* in terms of descriptions (characterizations) of use. That is, semantic notions must be definable in the *pragmatic* metavocabulary. Any methodologically acceptable *semantic* metavocabulary must be explicitly definable in the *pragmatic* metavocabulary (whether that is naturalistic, normative, or whatever).
- Sellars redescribes and objects to this sort of behaviorism (before Dummett espouses it) as **semantic *instrumentalism*** about theoretical entities.
Here the operative analogy is:
pragmatics : semantics :: use : meaning :: observation : theory
In natural science theoretical terms-entities are not required to be *definable* in terms of observable terms-entities.
Rather, they are postulated to stand in subjunctively robust explanatory relation to observables.
We should not (like the logical empiricists) be instrumentalists about theoretical entities, not in semantics (Sellars was addressing the philosophy of mind, objecting to Rylean behaviorism-as-instrumentalism, in *The Concept of Mind*.)

These are kinds of pragmatism about the relations between pragmatics and semantics.

c) I want to call "**methodological pragmatism**" the view that the *point* of postulating meanings is to codify regularities-or-proprieties (again the important metaconceptual divide) of use.

d) Q: Where is Rorty on this spectrum?

A: His anti-representationalism is not just a rejection of the dominant conceptual framework (metavocabulary) of semantics, it is a rejection of semantics entirely.
He has good reason for that. Since Descartes, the dominant tradition—indeed, the only *visible* tradition—in semantics has been dedicated to developing the *representationalist* paradigm (and applying it universally, in a declarativist spirit). One can read *PMN* as an extended argument against representationalist semantics = semantics, on the basis of the bad *epistemology* it underwrites and in some sense requires.
It is a substantial innovation, relative to that tradition, to argue that one might continue the project of systematic semantics without accompanying representationalist commitments.

But he might be an instrumentalist-behaviorist pragmatist about semantics, rather than a semantic nihilist.

Q: What about Price?
I think at this point he is following Rorty.

5.   *Formal* **semantics and** *philosophical* **semantics**.

a) **Formal semantics** has the job of computing semantic interpretants associated with compound or complex expressions (not the same thing: Dummett) from the semantic interpretants associated with simpler or more basic ones.
b) **Philosophical** semantics ("your mission, should you choose to accept it…") is to explain what it is about the *use* of expressions in virtue of which semantic interpretants of the kind needed for one's formal semantics get associated with expressions: what it is for expressions to be *used* in such a way that those practices *confer* the right kind of *meanings* to do formal semantics with.

Belated response to Patrick's question from last time:
I should have distinguished the enterprises of *formal* semantics from that of *philosophical* semantics. The former is concerned with computing the semantic interpretants of complex expressions from the semantic interpretants of simpler expressions. The latter is concerned with explaining, in the pragmatics (in a pragmatic metavocabulary) how it is that the *use* of expressions gets them associated with semantic interpretants of that kind in the first place. That is answering the question of how using the expressions in the way they are used *confers* that content on them, so establishing their association with semantic interpretants of the kind presupposed by formal semantics.

There are two orders of explanation possible here:
Can start with a semantic model, for instance, that of Tarskian model theory or its expressively powerful descendant, possible worlds semantics.
Both of these are representationalist, indeed, they are the most sophisticated development of the representationalist semantic model.

One then needs to put a pragmatics on top of that semantics. This will be a general account of use, rather than meaning, not a Gricean pragmatics.

Lewis acknowledges this obligation in "Languages and Language". It is getting together the *logical* (well, semantic, but both model theory and PW semantics are inspired to begin with by semantics for logical expressions) and the *anthropological* strands of thinking philosophically about language.

Specifically, one needs to think about what one must *do* or be able to do, what practices one must engage in or what abilities one must exercise, in order to establish the association of semantic interpretants with expressions.

This is a "semantics first" order of explanation.

Here one might pick a semantic paradigm that applies to one kind of idiom, say OED vocabulary.

It is usefully thought of as representational or descriptive in a narrow sense (say, tracking plus normative governance).

One then tries to extend it to the full range demarcated by declarativism.

This involves postulating facts and objects that stand to other idioms as the frog being on the log stands to "The frog is on the log."

This involves postulating "queer" (Mackie's term) sorts of facts and objects, when one looks at claims like "patience is a virtue", or claims about justice, obligations, probabilities....

The Tractarian positive discovery is that one can treat logical vocabulary differently, give it a different semantic treatment. But TLP throws up its hands when confronted with *semantic*, representational vocabulary. What it *tries* to say can only be *shown*. And normative or moral vocabulary is simply expelled from respectability. This is the negative thesis that inspired the Puritanism of the Vienna Circle.

c) Q: Why not just ignore formal "semantics"?

A: For me, the achievement of Lewis's "General Semantics" version of Lesniewski (published by Adjukiewics.)), as epitomized by **the account of the semantic interpretant of adverbs, and the semantic representation of the distinction in use between attributive and nonattributive adverbs** [**Tell this story!]**, is so obviously wonderful that that progress cannot be sacrificed or abandoned.

Another kind of pragmatism (different from, but related to, Rorty's social pragmatism about normativity) consists in pursuing instead a "pragmatics first" order of explanation.

This is pragmatism after the linguistic turn, when language becomes the big issue.

And it is pragmatism that does not just start with whatever sort of semantic interpretant it is convenient to associate with expressions in order to get on with the job of formal semantics: computing the semantic interpretants associated with complex or compound expressions (not the same thing: Dummett's complex predicates require analysis in the sense of dissection by substitution, not just compounding by applying operators) from the semantic interpretants associated with their simpler components (again, "components" in different senses for compounds and complexes).

This pragmatism asks what it is about the *use* of expressions in virtue of which semantic intepretants are associated with expressions in the first place.

    d) Taking on *this* task of philosophical semantics is a step beyond what *radical* pragmatists about semantics, like Rorty and Price, are willing to sanction.
Theirs is a radical *skeptical* form of pragmatist anti-representationalism.

    e) My form of *constructive pragmatist* anti-representationalism just does not use representational primitives in its formal semantics. It uses inferential ones (all the ISA, in fact), and constructs the representational dimension of meaning from them. But it does do *formal* semantics, and accepts the pragmatist demand for an adequate *philosophical* semantics.

6.   **Expressivism and Pragmatist Formal Semantics**

    a) A final punchline: The Frege-Geach point that expressivists must deal with the use of declarative sentences as embedded components of compound sentences, hence as not themselves force-bearing—which distinguishes second-wave Humean expressivists (HEX) such as Blackburn and Gibbard from first-wave expressivists like Ayer and Stevensono—is recognizably the demand that one be able to do *formal* semantics on the basis of what one makes available in one's pragmatic metavocabulary. This is a demand of *philosophical* semantics.

How doing that satisfies the second-wave HEX expressivism demand of *full* declarativism: the declarativism characteristic of *generalized* second-wave expressivism. That is expressivism that satisfies the Frege-Geach criterion of adequacy: to underwrite a notion of content that accounts for the role of declarative sentences as embedded, semantically significant components of assertible/asserted compounds. This is what *formal* semantics requires of the *philosophical* semantics our extension of RR's linguistic pragmatism promises.

    b) And the move common to Price in TCF and me in T&A permits just this—though that is a point I develop and elaborate, and he does not.

    c) So I claim that in order to bring about the synthesis Price aims at, of Rortyan pragmatism and Humean expressivism globalized, by understanding both as subject naturalism, he in fact needs to embrace the requirements of *formal* semantics and, *so*, a *philosophical* semantics that is acceptable from a pragmatist point of view.

[Then story of Ch. 6 of AR.? Not for class.]

7.   I show one way one might begin to do that, appealing only to *conditionals* and *substitution inferences,* in the second half of T&A.
This inferentialism (ISA: inference-substitution-anaphora, from *MIE*) is a kind of specifically

    • *constructive semantic* anti-representationalism

that goes far beyond Rorty and Price's

- *skeptical pragmatic* anti-representationalism.

Both are forms of *pragmatism* as anti-representationalism.

<u>Conclusion</u>:

a) The first key lesson is that in addition to looking at what entitles one to (commitment to) a claimable, upstream, one must also look downstream to what (commitment to) a claimable

i) entitles one (is a reason for) and

ii) precludes entitlement to (is a reason against).

I exploit the first, and Price exploits the second. But the points belong together.

b) It turns out that doing that enables one to satisfy the Frege-Geach/formal semantics requirement (criterion of adequacy) of getting a notion of content that can go with *embedded* occurrences of declarative sentences, not just *asserted* ones.